Of all Tom's investigations, the tale of Ali Mohamed
remains "the most incredible spy story" he's yet come across.
Without Mohamed, Mr. Secker suggests there would be no al-Qaeda as the world knows it — "probably no WTC93, no embassy bombings, quite possibly no 9/11." Mohamed trained most of al-Qaeda's important footsoldiers in a dozen countries, and Bin Laden's bodyguards, conducted surveillance for the 1998 US embassy attacks in Sudan, and helped move Bin Laden from Sudan back to Afghanistan in 1996 — all while being a part-time FBI informant, serving in the US Special Forces and working for the CIA. The CIA claimed Mohamed was sacked in the mid-1980s, but Mr. Secker claims this is "total nonsense."
"When one of the defense lawyers in the US vs Rahman trial attempted to subpoena Mohamed, the prosecution wouldn't reveal where he was. When they eventually tracked him down, the prosecution told him to ignore the subpoena, and he never testified. Years later he was arrested, cooperated with authorities and offered one brief allocution, before disappearing, perhaps into protective custody. He even offered, in the wake of 9/11, to help the US government find Bin Laden and bring him to justice, leading one special forces unit to consider dropping Mohamed into Afghanistan
, and injecting him with a time-delay poison pill," Mr. Secker told Sputnik.
A "less clear" yet still "incredibly important" example is "whatever was going on" with 9/11 hijackers Khalid Al Midhar, and Nawaf Al Hazmi. The CIA and NSA were monitoring
al-Qaeda's communications hub in Yemen — as a result, Mr. Secker believes US authorities should've been able to stop the attempted bombing on USS The Sullivans, the successful bombing of the USS Cole, and "probably" 9/11 as well.
The first two were carried out by a local al-Qaeda arm financed by Jamal Khalifa, who also funded the Bojinka Plot — and was Bin Laden's brother-in-law. Former US National Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure Protection and Counter-Terrorism Richard Clarke has said the CIA deliberately withheld information on Al Midhar and Al Hazmi from the FBI and White House, because they'd recruited them, or were trying to — an aspect of 9/11 the official investigation failed to scrutinize.
"Finally, 18 months after the two al-Qaeda men arrived in the US, the CIA, in a very low key way, passed a report to the FBI about al-Mihdhar and al-Hamzi. It was too late. Their trail had gone cold. They'd entered the final phase of preparations for 9/11. Nothing in the joint congressional investigation, the 9/11 Commission's work or the CIA Inspector General's investigation explains why the CIA hid its knowledge about these two al-Qaeda operatives," Clarke has alleged
However, Mr. Secker believes the behavior of certain officials, most prominently Tom Wilshire of the CIA's Bin Laden unit, suggests even Clarke's narrative doesn't truly get to the bottom of things. Despite alerting superiors to Al Midhar's significance and impending involvement in a major al-Qaeda attack, he continued
to protect and hide information on the target.
"This suggests Al Midhar was still working for the CIA in some way, right up until the moment Flight 77 smashed into the Pentagon," he grimly concludes. Sputnik contacted the CIA for comment, but is yet to receive a response as of January 31.